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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to set aside a trust agreement on
the grounds of mental incompetence of the trustor, fraud,
and/or undue influence exercised by defendant-respondent
Thora J. Campbell.
DISPOSITION BELOW
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence, the trial
judge, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., granted defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent seeks affirmance of the decision
below.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
Respondent controverts the "Statement of Facts" contained in appellants' Brief in almost all respects, as said
statement is in essence an argument of the evidence.

The

facts material to this action are as follows:
In August of 1970, Marinus Johnson (father of the
parties to this action) consulted attorneys at the firm of
Fabian & Clendenin with respect to estate planning. [R. 206].
Mr. Johnson eventually executed a will and trust prepared by
Mssrs. William Vogel and George D. Melling, Jr., attorneys at
Fabian & Clendenin.

The trust was executed on March 5, 1971.
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It named his daughter, Thora J. Campbell, Trustee.

By the terms

of the trust, $2,500 was to go to Mr. Johnson's son, Eldon,
certain real and personal property was to go to Thora, and
the remainder of the trust estate was to be divided in four
shares, one to daughter LaVerne, one to daughter Darlene, and
two to Thora.

[Plaintiff's Exhibit l].

The terms of the trust were carefully explained to
Mr. Johnson by Mr. Melling at the time of its execution.

[R.241·

Both Mr. Melling and Mr. Vogel testified that Mr. Johnson appear'
to be completely competent to execute the trust and that there
was no evidence that he did not know what he was doing or was
being unduly influenced by anyone.

[R. 216, 247].

During the four years subsequent to execution of the
trust and prior to his death in 1975, Mr. Johnson acknowledged
and ratified the existence and validity of the trust.

He con-

veyed several parcels of real property into the trust, assigned
into it real estate contracts, and signed
returns.

and filed trust tax

All of these documents and transactions referred to

the trust and to the trustee, Thora J. Campbell.

[Trial Exhibit:

2-10, 29, 31, 32, 45].

ARGUMENT
As Judge Baldwin stated in granting defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, plaintiff did not present "one iota" of evidence

-2-
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to substantiate their case.

As trier of fact in an equitable

action, Judge Baldwin's decision may be reversed only if the
evidence strongly preponderates against it or if he abused his
discretion.

Plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case,

as the presumption that might have aided them was obliterated
by the testimony of their own witnesses.

The decision in a prior case dealing with related will
documents is not res judicta of the issues presented to the
trial court in the instant action.

Furthermore, examination

of the record in both actions makes it patently clear that
Judge Baldwin's decision was correct and should be affirmed.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
MUST BE AFFIRMED UNLESS
MANIFESTLY IN ERROR

The issues tried in this action were equitable in
nature.

Article VIII, §9 of the Constitution of the State of

Utah grants this Court the power to review questions of fact
and law in equity actions.

That standard of review has been

defined and refined by this Court in several cases.

The Court

has consistently held that, while review may be made of the
factual record below, the trial court's findings of fact and
decisions must be given tremendous weight.

Thus, it has

variously been held that the trial court's findings must stand
unless the evidence so clearly preponderates against them that
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the result constitutes a manifest injustice, Hatch v. Bastian,
567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977), or the evidence clearly preponderat~
against the lower court's findings, Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d
811 (Utah 1972),or the findings are clearly erroneous, Nunley
v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (Utah 1962).

This Court has also stated

that in reviewing the lower court's decision, it must be kept
in mind that the trial judge had the advantage of hearing and
seeing the witnesses.
II.

Barker v. Dunham, 342 P.2d 867 (Utah 1959;
ANY PRESUMPTION OF UNFAIRNESS OR
UNDUE INFLUENCE WAS CONTRADICTED
AND ELIMINATED BY PLAINTIFFS'
OWN EVIDENCE

Plaintiffs have placed enormous reliance upon a presumption used in the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 337 P.2d
420 (Utah 1959) to establish their prime facie case of undue
influence.

The rule as stated therein is that when a confidenti<

relationship is established and a gift or conveyance is made to
the party in a superior position, a presumption arises that the
transaction was unfair.

Id. at 422.

Plaintiffs argue that they

established the presumption by introducing evidence of dealings
between Marinus Johnson and his daughter Thora, and that the
burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to overcome the
presumption.
Assuming for the purposes of argument that the presumption of unfairness indeed arose in the course of plaintiffs'
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case, the issue upon appeal becomes whether that presumption
mandated presentation of evidence by the defendant.
is clearly no.

The answer

The testimony of plaintiffs' own witnesses

totally contradicted any presumption that might have arisen.
As such, the presumption disappeared and plaintiffs were left
without any basis for a prima facie case.
As this Court has explained in the past, a presumption
of the type discussed in the Johnson case is one of law.

Pre-

sumptions of law are rebuttable, and disappear from the case
when evidence to contradict them, sufficient to amount to some
evidence, is presented.
1951).

Wyatt v. Baughman, 239 P.2d 193 (Utah

(Emphasis the Court's).
It may be the usual case that rebuttal testimony comes

from the case put on by the party seeking to rebut the presumption.
If the contradictory testimony comes from the witnesses called
on behalf of the party who seeks to rely on the presumption, the
presumption will be eliminated.

In The Colorado & Utah Coal

Company, 369 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1962), the Supreme Court stated,
citing prior California decisions:
No party can claim the right of a presumption
against his own admission under oath. [Cite
omitted]. The force of a presumption is
exhausted when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted
testimony of the party relying on it . . .
Id. at 799.
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In Tice v. Kaiser Co.

Inc., 226 P.2d 624 (Cal. App. 19Y

the plaintiff sought to rely upon a presumption that the decease
had exercised due care.

The presumption had arisen during the

presentation of the case, but the plaintiff went on and called a,
witnesses the workmen who had seen the subject accident and who
testified as to the conduct of the deceased.

The California cou:

ruled that the presumption had disappeared:
In order to be entitled to such a presumption,
the party relying upon it must first establish
a sphere or field within which the presumption
may operate. . . The disputable presumption
that a decedent exercises due care is dispelled,
has no probative value, and disappears from the
case when the litigant relying upon the presumption introduces evidence contrary to the fact
presumed.
Id. at 629.
As will be discussed infra, while plaintiffs' evidence
in this instant case may have given rise to the presumption
(i.e. Thora Campbell was a business advisor to her father and
received more property than her siblings), there was not one
shred of evidence to support a claim of fraud, undue influence,
or incompetence.

Quite to the contrary, plaintiffs' ownwitness1

produced convincing and consistent evidence that Marinus Johnson
knew exactly what he was doing when he executed his trust.

Judgi

Baldwin had no reason to require defendant to put on testimony
that would only be duplicative and cumulative of that presented
by plaintiffs.

The presumption of unfairness had long since bee;

-6-
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obliterated by plaintiffs' witnesses, and with its demise went
plaintiffs' prima facie case.
III.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE RULING OF THE COURT

Plaintiffs called six witnesses at trial.

There was

not one bit of evidence that Marinus Johnson was incompetent
either in 1971 or thereafter until his death.

There was not

one bit of evidence that the distribution in his trust was the
result of fraud or undue influence.

There was not one bit of

evidence to contradict the fact that Marinus Johnson knew
exactly what he was doing when he left his property in an unequal
distribution.
In contrast to the absolute lack of evidence to support
plaintiffs' case, the trial court heard the following affirmative
testimony supporting the validity of the trust:
William Vogel, an estate specialist with Fabian &
Clendenin, testified that he first met Marinus Johnson in
August, 1970.

Mr. Johnson was accompanied by Thora Campbell.

(Incidentally, plaintiffs are in error in their brief wherein
they claim Mrs. Campbell denied meeting Vogel.

See R. 183).

At that conference, several possibilities for distribution of
the property were discussed.

Plaintiffs infer that Mrs. Campbell

was railroading the process because she was doing a lot of the
talking at the meeting.

What plaintiffs neglect to tell this

Court is that Hr. Vogel testified her comments were in response
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to inquiries into the details of Mr. Johnson's properties.
[R. 216 and 226].
Mr. Vogel sent out a draft trust that provided for
equal distribution to the three sisters.

In their brief,

plaintiffs would leave this Court with the erroneous impression
that the distribution had been decided upon by Mr. Johnson.
Again plaintiffs ignore the testimony of Mr. Vogel:

the

distribution in the draft was an arbitrary election by Vogel
made only for the purpose of getting a draft instrument to Mr.
Johnson.

[R. 218].
Even more seriously misleading is plaintiffs' total

failure to refer to Mr. Vogel's testimony as to the capacity
of Mr. Johnson and the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the trust.

First, Mr. Vogel testified that he would take

particular care when doing an estate for an elderly person.
[R. 220].

He was fully satisfied that Marinus Johnson under-

stood what he was doing.

[R. 221].

Further, he increased his

usual precautions in light of the unequal distribution of the
estate.

[R. 221].

Finally, he testified [R.222]:

Q All right.

Was there anything that was
going on, anything that you observed that
led you to believe or suspect that Marinus
Johnson was not doing what he wanted to do
but, rather was being coerced or was being
unduly influenced by Thora Campbell?
A

There is nothing that led me to suspect
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that Thora Campbell was unduly influencing
him.
Mr. Vogel's partner George D. Melling, Jr. testified.
Mr. Melling took over the job of finishing the trust agreement.
Plaintiffs ignore Mr. Melling's testimony with respect to the
clai~s

at issue in the suit.

At the time the trust was executed,

Mr. Melling went over the trust page by page with Mr. Johnson.
[R. 241].
out.

The trust was revocable, and that provision was pointed

[R. 245].

Particularly in light of the unequal distribution

under the trust, Mr. Melling was sure the terms of the trust were
carefully discussed.

[R. 246-247].

Like Mr. Vogel, Mr. Melling

testified that Marinus Johnson was mentally competent to execute
the trust, and that there was no evidence of undue influence.
[R. 247].

Alta Johnson had no knowledge of the trust during Mr.
Johnson's lifetime.

Her only testimony pertinent to the creation

of the trust related to the physical and mental condition of Mr.
Johnson.

She testified that he drove his car until 1973, was

not bedridden, often visited his properties in the southern
part of Utah, and maintained his social contacts.

[R. 295-296].

LaVerne Robertson's testimony never touched on anything
other than her husband's education and the fact that she had not
lived in Utah for over 35 years.

-9-
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Plaintiffs' final witness, a grandson named Jeffrey
Child, said his grandfather in 1971 made a vague allusion to
the fact he would one day get some of the property (which in
fact he would under the trust) [R. 307) and that his grandfather
was perfectly alert and knew what he was doing.

[R. 308].

In light of this testimony, can one possibly conclude
that plaintiffs raised even a spectre of mental incompetence,
fraud, or undue influence?
v. Johnson,

~.

This case is not akin to Johnson

where the evidence disclosed that the elderly

father was senile and did not know what he was doing when he
gave his son a great deal of his property.

337 P.2d at 423.

In contrast to the situation before the court in the Johnson
case, the testimony heard by Judge Baldwin presented a picture
of a man who was emphatic in wanting a distribution of his
property that was not to be equal to his four children (testimony of William Vogel, R.216 ), that Mr. Johnson was mentally
alert and competent, that the trust was fully explained to him,
that he continued to execute documents respecting the trust
for four years after its creation, and that during that four
year period he was able to handle his affairs.
Judge Baldwin heard all of the testimony and examined
all of the exhibits, not just the distorted fragments contained
in plaintiffs' brief.

The propriety of his decision is best
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measured by attempting to answer this question:

what evidence

presented by plaintiffs was there for defendant to contradict?
IV.

THE JUDGMENT I~ THE WILL
CONTEST IS NOT DISPOSITIVE
OF THIS ACTION

Plaintiffs admit in their brief that the prior will contest
and the instant case are two separate matters and were properly
treated as such.

The issues involved in a proceeding probating

a will and one challenging the validity of a trust agreement
are not at all the same.

For one, a trust that might be con-

sidered to have been executed while the settler was being tmduly
influenced may be subsequently ratified when the settler regains
his free will.

Kazaras v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 156 N.Y.S. 2d

275, affd. 164 N.Y.S. 2d 211, affd. 175 N.Y.S. 2d 172 (N.Y. 1956);
Vanderlinde v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 259 N.W. 337 (Mich.
19 35) .

It is elementary that relitigation of an issue is barred

only if the matter to be foreclosed was actually decided in a
prior proceeding.

5 0 Corpus Juris Secundum, "Judgments" § 172 (1) .

While the jury in the prior action found two wills of Maritmus
Johnson to have been executed while Mr. Johnson was under undue
influence, that was all that was decided.
trust was not before the jury.
not even addressed.

The validity of the

Questions of ratification were

There is simply no basis for holding that

the prior determination is dispositive.
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Furthermore, although defendant has chosen not to
confuse the issues presented by plaintiffs' appeal by pursuing
an appeal of the prior action, the references in plaintiffs'
brief to the evidence in the will contest warrant coilil!lent.
Plaintiffs assert that the testimony in the two trials was
the same.

Plaintiffs are not correct.

For instance, in the

first action Mr. Vogel testified that at the 1970 meeting Mrs.
Campbell did most of the talking.

Nothing further in this regan

was elicited from him, and the inference certainly existed that
the defendant was directing the provisions of the will and trust
That mistaken inference was disspelled in the trust trial when
Mr. Vogel explained that Mrs. Campbell was only giving informati1
as to the details of her father's properties.
A similar omission in the first trial was that Mr.
Vogel was never asked whether Marinus Johnson expressed a
desire to change the equal distribution under his 1969 will
(which was eventually probated).

In the trust action, Mr.

Vogel testified that Mr. Johnson was emphatic about reducing
his son's share [R. 216].

In the first trial neither of the

lawyers was asked his opinion as to the competence or free will
of Mr. Johnson.

Their testimony in the latter trial was unequi~

In short, the judgment of the jury might seem at odds wi:
Judge Baldwin's decision, but it is entirely explainable when
one considers the additional evidence adduced in the trial of th

-12-
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1

trust.

And in any event the evidence of ratification makes the

jury's determination in the earlier action totally irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs had every opportunity to produce evidence of
fraud, undue influence, and mental incompetence.

What they came

up with were witnesses who testified that Marinus Johnson understood what he was doing, that the attorneys who prepared the
trust fully and carefully explained its content and effect to
him, and that he participated in the operation of the trust from
the date of its execution until his death some four years later.
Plaintiffs wholly failed to put into the record any evidence to
support their claims.

The trial court was entirely correct in

sparing the defendant the unnecessary effort of responding to
plaintiffs' case, as plaintiffs had already done an effective
job of putting on consistent and convincing testimony substantiating defendant's position that the trust of Marinus Johnson
was valid in all respects.
For these and all other foregoing reasons, defendant
respectfully submits that the Order of Dismissal entered in
the court below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of June, 1981.
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